Rare earths: how to use them
We are talking about a family of 17 metals (lanthanides, plus yttrium and scandium) found in our everyday objects and infrastructure: smartphones, electric vehicles, wind turbines, fighter jets, sensors, and catalysts.
Rare earths, central to the digital revolution and energy transition
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"Rare"? Not really in the Earth's crust. Tens of millions of tons in China and Vietnam, thousands more in India, Brazil, and Russia. In total, more than 115 million tons of rare earth elements have been identified by the United States Geological Survey (USGS).
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Scattered throughout the Earth's crust and mixed together, they require extensive extraction to recover small amounts—followed by complex, lengthy, and costly separation processes. For example, neodymium or samarium are used in magnetic alloys; cerium or lanthanum in catalytic converters; and others in technical ceramics and glass. Without them, there would be no compact permanent magnets for turbines or rotors, no high-performance hard drives, and no cutting-edge electronics.
A 5 MW offshore wind turbine can consume hundreds of kilograms of rare earths; an F-35 carries more than 400 kg of components containing rare earths, scattered throughout its actuators, sensors, and mission systems.
Although rare earths are abundant on Earth, their extraction and processing remain largely in the hands of China. According to the International Energy Agency, the country accounts for around 61% of rare earth extraction and 92% of rare earth refining. In addition, it supplies nearly 99% of the EU's supply of 17 rare earths, as well as approximately 98% of its rare earth permanent magnets. Global demand for these minerals is expected to increase by 50 to 60% by 2040.
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So how did we get here?
Before the shift: when the West was in control
We tend to forget that until the 1990s, the rare earths industry was dominated by the US and Europe. In California, the Mountain Pass mine reigned supreme for decades: at its peak, between the 1960s and 1980s, it alone supplied most of the global market, accounting for up to 70% of production at times. In France, Rhône-Poulenc established itself as the leader in chemical separation; its plant in La Rochelle shipped high-purity oxides to industry worldwide. The ecosystem was in place: mines, refineries, expertise.
However, the extraction and refining of rare earths is the other side of progress: concentrated acids, solvents, sludge, and sometimes radioactivity (uranium and thorium associated with the minerals). In California, leaks of residue-laden fluids into the desert are weighing heavily on Mountain Pass: fines, tarnished image, investments to be made. Under pressure from stricter standards, the refining unit shut down in 1998; the mine, bled dry by world prices, closed in 2002, leaving more room for China...
USGS
... while China rolls out its plan
At the same time, Beijing is stepping up its efforts. Deposits, lower wages, more flexible environmental standards, targeted public aid: it's a formidable combination. In the late 1970s, Chinese planners set the course: rare earths would be the "vitamins of modern industry." Deng Xiaoping's formula hit the mark: "The Middle East has oil, China has rare earths." From then on, the long-term strategy was to secure the ore, master the chemistry of separation, capture value in components (alloys, magnets, motors) and, above all, integrate the entire chain.
In the 1990s, critical expertise was still American and Japanese, particularly in neodymium-iron-boron magnets, the heart of compact generators and motors. Beijing moved forward through acquisitions and incentives: in 1997, the American company Magnequench (formerly GM) came under Chinese ownership—including patents and processes. In Japan, China became the key supplier of purified oxides, then encouraged the relocation of production stages to its own soil. In less than fifteen years, it rebuilt the technological arsenal it lacked. Where other countries are content to extract the ore, China completes the process: refining, metallurgy, then manufacturing magnets and sub-assemblies. As a result, even concentrates extracted outside China often end up back in China due to a lack of local separation plants.
Today, Beijing controls almost all of the refining process: most of the "light" rare earths (cerium, neodymium, lanthanum) and almost all of the "heavy" rare earths (dysprosium, terbium) essential to advanced technologies come from its production lines. And when it comes to rare earths, China is talking about quotas.
In this context, a quota is a ceiling set by the state on the quantity that an industry is allowed to extract (mining quotas) and refine/separate (smelting-separation quotas) over a given period. In China, these limits are generally announced by the Ministry of Industry (MIIT) and relayed to customers by the major public groups in the sector (mainly China Rare Earth Resources and China Northern Rare Earth). This year, Beijing published the first wave of quotas late, without any public announcement, and asked companies not to disclose the figures (for security reasons), hence the lack of official information. Last year, to give an idea, the ceilings totaled around 270,000 tons for extraction and 254,000 tons for refining. Beijing uses these quotas (and export restrictions) to control supply and influence its trade discussions
A Western awakening... but an incomplete one
The West is belatedly realizing that these "niche" metals are, in fact, the backbone of electrified capitalism. When Washington and Brussels talk about reindustrialization, electric vehicles, wind power, missiles... they are, in fact, talking about rare earths. However, today's supply chain is written in Mandarin: export licenses, national priorities, Beijing's decisions. Since then, mines have reopened or emerged (in the United States, Australia, and Southeast Asia): China's share of gross extraction has declined in fits and starts during the 2010s. But the statistical illusion is no mistake: dependence remains at a critical level—refining and magnet manufacturing. In other words, even when the West mines, it still sends the ore to China for purification, then buys back "ready-to-use" components for its automotive, wind turbine, telecommunications, and military industries.
Radars, actuators, guidance systems, avionics: modern weaponry consumes rare earths. The idea that these inputs could be rationed by a rival power has become a planning scenario, not a fantasy. Hence the obsession with "disarming the bottleneck" in Washington and Brussels: redeploying separation units, subsidizing magnets, launching recycling—and relearning a dirty, slow, costly trade. But you can't rebuild thirty years of disinvestment and evaporated know-how overnight.
Regaining control: Western initiatives in the face of Chinese monopoly
On the US side, there is no more procrastination. Public orders, targeted subsidies, strategic financing: the Department of Energy (DoE) and the Pentagon (DoD) are buying, rebuilding stocks, and "de-risking" investments.
In 2017, Mountain Pass, the historic California mine, restarted under the MP Materials banner; behind it, a separation plant on American soil is being financed so that the concentrate no longer has to cross the Pacific. The stated goal is to rebuild an integrated "mine-to-magnet" chain—extraction, refining, metallurgy, components—without stopping in China. Against a backdrop of rising tensions between China and the US, the shares of US-listed companies MP Materials, USA Rare Earth, and Lynas in Australia have more than doubled this year.
Canada is following suit: accelerated exploration in the North, on-site processing projects, additional links in the same North American chain. The US has acquired stakes in Lithium Americas and Trilogy Metals, two Canadian mining companies, in order to strengthen its financial power. Their shares have since doubled and tripled in value, respectively.
In Brussels, this awareness has been translated into legislation: the Critical Raw Materials Act (2024). On the agenda: local production targets, streamlined procedures for mines and refineries, financing, and supply agreements with reliable partners. On the ground, Sweden has announced a large deposit in Kiruna; in France, Solvay (heir to Rhône-Poulenc) wants to relaunch separation/purification lines in La Rochelle, with a focus on permanent magnets. If these projects are successful, Europe will regain a lost skill—the fine chemistry of rare earths—which is key to breaking its dependence.
Another, more discreet front is recycling. Japan paved the way after the shock of 2010 by recovering rare earths from used magnets and electronic waste. Technically, this is as demanding a chemical process as mining: separating a few grams of high-purity neodymium is no easy task. R&D programs are seeking to lower costs, reuse imperfectly purified alloys (with a slight tolerance in terms of performance), and eco-design machines to consume fewer rare earths per device. At the same time, substitute materials are being tested for certain functions in order to ease the pressure on supply.
Final word
In conclusion, the message is clear, almost didactic: by restricting exports of rare earths and critical metals (gallium, germanium, "heavy" metals, etc.) against a backdrop of tension with the United States, China is reminding us that the techno-industrial battle is also being fought in mines, refineries, and supply chains. This is yet another chapter in the "semiconductor war," where each side is tightening its export controls in the name of national security.
In this arena, Beijing is playing on home turf. With around 70% of global production and a virtual monopoly on several "heavy" elements, it has what it takes to turn a raw material into a political lever. One turn of the screw, and entire sectors of Western green technology, advanced electronics, and defense feel the pressure mounting. The "weapon of access" is assumed: limiting supply is a way of testing the vulnerability of the other side.
For Washington and its allies, the conclusion is clear: accelerate diversification now. Open new mines outside China, revive local refining, subsidize separation, promote recycling, and build strategic stocks. In other words, reduce the hostage risk of critical supply chains and regain industrial freedom.
