Revenues are down by 1.2% and operating profit is down by a factor of three compared to the first quarter of last year. The inflationary pressure, coupled with the expansion of the production facilities and the resulting increase in the cost structure, is being felt very strongly.

Cash generation is negative, with EUR 1.1 billion consumed by operations and investments, whereas Airbus remained marginally profitable last year at this time with a positive free cash flow of EUR 120 million.

The peak in orders in the civil aviation segment was expected. Post-pandemic, airlines are resuming their fleet renewal initiatives, while Boeing's difficulties - with Intel, perhaps the most blatant American industrial suicide of the last decade - are doing the business of its European rival.

Airbus' business is certainly hyper-strategic, almost duopolistic, and protected by immense competitive advantages - a huge "moat" in the jargon of investors. However, it is chronically difficult to generate cash profits.

Over the past decade, nine-tenths of cash flow has been reinvested in fixed assets or acquisitions. If Airbus' status did not make it easy to borrow on the capital markets, dividend distribution would have been much more complicated.

As the business is not characterized by strong growth - but rather by perfect stability of revenues - all other things being equal, it seems reasonable to pay dividends. Since the business is not characterized by strong growth - but rather by perfect stability of revenues - all other things being equal, it seems reasonable to assume that Airbus will be able to return as much capital to its shareholders in the next decade as it did in the previous one, i.e. EUR 9 billion.

This should be set against a market capitalization of EUR 95 billion. Even if we imagine Airbus being able to return twice as much to its shareholders over the next decade, i.e. $18 billion in total, it would take five decades for the shareholders to recoup their initial investment.