PG&E : November 23, 2021 PG&E Independent Monitor Report of November 19, 2021

Case 3:14-cr-00175-WHA Document 1524-1 Filed 11/23/21 Page 1 of 91

PG&E Independent

Monitor Report of

November 19, 2021

Case 3:14-cr-00175-WHA Document 1524-1 Filed 11/23/21 Page 2 of 91

			TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.	INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................................	1
	A.	Factual Background ................................................................................................	1
	B.	Overarching Themes...............................................................................................	2
II.	SAFETY OBSERVATIONS............................................................................................	3
III.	GAS OPERATIONS.........................................................................................................	4
	A.	Introduction.............................................................................................................	4
	B.	The 15 Technical Requirements .............................................................................	5
	C.	Progress Across the 15 Technical Requirements....................................................	5
	D.	Gas Operations Challenges ...................................................................................	11
IV.	COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS.....................................................................................	13
V.	SAFETY AT PG&E........................................................................................................	15
VI.	WILDFIRE MITIGATION EFFORTS........................................................................	17
VII.	VEGETATION MANAGEMENT ................................................................................	20
	A.	Background ...........................................................................................................	21
	B.	Quality of Work Execution...................................................................................	22
	C.	Prioritization of Work ...........................................................................................	24
	D.	Scope of Work ......................................................................................................	25
	E.	Recordkeeping ......................................................................................................	27
	F.	Contractor Management........................................................................................	28
VIII. ELECTRIC INFRASTRUCTURE INSPECTIONS AND REMEDIATION
	WORK .............................................................................................................................	29
	A.	PG&E's Wildfire Mitigation Plan Commitments to the CPUC ...........................	30
	B.	Quality of Work ....................................................................................................	30
		1.	Distribution Inspection Results.................................................................	31
		2.	Transmission Inspection Results...............................................................	32
		3.	PG&E Quality Control Efforts..................................................................	33
	C.	Inspection Guidance Materials, Resources and Training .....................................	34
	D.	Maintenance and Construction .............................................................................	35
		1.	Volume and Timeliness of Remediation Work ........................................	35
		2.	Effects of Pending, Unresolved Tags........................................................	36
		3.	Field Safety Reassessments ("FSRs") ......................................................	37
	E.	Recordkeeping ......................................................................................................	37
		1.	Paper Records ...........................................................................................	37
		2.	Asset Location Issues................................................................................	38
		3.	Asset Component Age ..............................................................................	38
		4.	Other Recordkeeping Issues .....................................................................	39
IX.	SYSTEM HARDENING PROGRAM ..........................................................................	40
	A.	System Hardening Approval Process....................................................................	40
	B.	Decreasing Targets................................................................................................	41
	C.	2021 System Hardening........................................................................................	41
	D.	Undergrounding Initiative.....................................................................................	42
	E.	Challenges.............................................................................................................	43
		1.	Permitting..................................................................................................	43
		2.	Scaling of the Distribution Hardening Program .......................................	43
		3.	Fire Rebuild Work ....................................................................................	43

i

Case 3:14-cr-00175-WHA Document 1524-1 Filed 11/23/21 Page 3 of 91

X.	WILDFIRE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE..........................	44
	A.	PSPS......................................................................................................................	44
	B.	Enhanced Power Line Safety Settings ..................................................................	45
XI.	CONTINUING CHALLENGES ...................................................................................	46
	A.	Leadership Turnover.............................................................................................	46
	B.	Records Integrity...................................................................................................	47
	C.	Contractor Management........................................................................................	47
	D.	Long-Term Safety Projects ...................................................................................	48
	E.	Near-Term Execution of Work .............................................................................	48
	F.	Attention to Resources in Gas Operations ............................................................	49
XII.	CONCLUDING REMARKS .........................................................................................	50

ii

Case 3:14-cr-00175-WHA Document 1524-1 Filed 11/23/21 Page 4 of 91

1. INTRODUCTION

1. Factual Background

On September 9, 2010 PG&E's 30-inch gas transmission line in San Bruno ruptured, exploded, and burned uncontrollably for hours while PG&E employees attempted to shut off the gas. The explosion destroyed the Crestmoor neighborhood in San Bruno and killed eight people: Lavonne Bullis, 82; Greg Bullis, 50; William Bullis, 17; James Franco, 58; Jacqueline Greig, 44; Janessa Greig, 13; Jessica Morales, 20; and Elizabeth Torres, 81.

Six years later, PG&E was found guilty by a federal jury after a multi-week trial of six felony violations. These included various felony violations related to Gas Operations recordkeeping and another felony violation for obstruction of justice concerning a National Transportation Safety Board investigation of gas pipeline testing. The guilty verdict resulted in the imposition of a federal monitor and the creation of this Monitorship in 2017. The initial foci of the Monitorship, as set forth in a January 26, 2017 judgment and Court order (Dkt. 916), were: (1) 15 technical requirements related to PG&E's Gas Operations; (2) PG&E's Compliance and Ethics program; and (3) PG&E's efforts to become a safer utility. Those areas are discussed below at Sections III-V.

The Monitorship proceeded along those lines from 2017 to 2018. In late 2018 and early 2019, the Court expanded the scope of the Monitorship to include an assessment of PG&E's wildfire mitigation efforts following the 22 deaths and destruction caused by PG&E in the 2017 Northern California wildfires (including the Wine Country Fires and the North Country Fires), as well as the Camp Fire of 2018, in which 84 people were killed and the city of Paradise in Butte County was destroyed. Including the Camp Fire fatalities, over 110 people have died as a result of wildfires where CAL FIRE has determined PG&E equipment was involved since the San Bruno incident.1

1 During the course of the Monitorship, the Monitor team did not investigate or make any determinations about the cause and origin of fires. Those issues were the province of many other authorities, including regulators and law enforcement agencies which took possession of certain evidence and sometimes initiated prosecutions, and numerous

1

Case 3:14-cr-00175-WHA Document 1524-1 Filed 11/23/21 Page 5 of 91

Appended as Exhibit 1 is a list of the victims of those wildfires.

The Court's oversight of PG&E's wildfire mitigation efforts substantially augmented the scope of the January 2017 order. Since that time, the Monitor team's evaluation of PG&E's wildfire mitigation efforts has focused on four core areas: (1) vegetation management ("VM");

1. infrastructure inspections and repairs; (3) system hardening; and (4) emergency preparedness and response. Those areas are discussed in Sections VII-X below.
   PG&E wildfire mitigation efforts the past few years have been insufficient to stop wildfires caused by PG&E equipment. Each year since 2017, PG&E equipment has been associated with at least one catastrophic wildfire. That is obviously unacceptable, and PG&E must improve and fix this situation.

1. Overarching Themes

As explained below, PG&E has demonstrated progress within the scope of the Monitorship, and sometimes substantial progress. Regarding Gas Operations, PG&E's reform and improvement work, some of which began after San Bruno and before the Monitorship started, has been sustained and substantial. There has also been sustained and substantial improvement in the Compliance and Ethics area, although the Company needs to continue to try to overcome worker skepticism, particularly among longer-tenured employees, that the Company does not want to hear bad news and will retaliate for it, and that PG&E admonitions to "Speak Up" are not sincere.

Progress regarding wildfire mitigation obviously has been inadequate, and we doubt anyone would seriously dispute that, given the ongoing and profound safety issues in that area of operations.

civil litigants and their attorneys with their own due process rights to present their own claims. The numbers here of deaths caused by PG&E come from data such as PG&E's 84 guilty pleas in June 2020 to involuntary manslaughter in connection with the Camp Fire and deaths, as well as CAL FIRE determinations on cause and origin of fires.

Nothing in this report purports to assert a factual finding or evidence concerning any pending or future litigation. These observations are intended to be candid comments based on our work as a Monitor team, but we did not conduct that work in a manner structured by state or federal adjudicatory rules or process.

2