Teck's Dual Class Amendment
Prior to the Dual Class Amendment, Teck's Class A common shares each had 100 votes per share, whereas the Class B common subordinate voting shares each had one. On
While not common among publicly traded corporations in
DCSS - What are they and why?
A DCSS or multi-class share structure exists when a corporation's share capital consists of two (or more) classes of common shares with different voting rights. By having a greater number of votes per share, the superior voting class shareholders can exercise disproportionately more control over the company. These types of shares are typically held by founders and high-level executives, who are thus able to retain decision-making authority. This provides founders and executives with greater freedom to pursue long-term goals, without having their power challenged by shareholders who are more interested in short-term tactics and gains. Moreover, DCSS also provide protection against proxy battles and hostile takeovers by making it more difficult to win a shareholder majority and overthrow existing management.
Concerns with DCSS
Conversely, DCSS can give rise to corporate governance concerns. By their nature, DCSS result in a misalignment between voting rights and economic interest within a company. For example, in Teck's case, the holders of approximately 1.5% of the total number of outstanding Teck shares are entitled to exercise approximately 60.5% of the votes attached to all Teck shares. Critics of DCSS claim that these structures allow company executives to "have their cake and eat it too" because they permit executives to raise capital without giving up control.2 Further, because DCSS can allow executives to hold relatively small equity stakes within their companies, they can be insulated from the financial repercussions of poor decision-making and corresponding share price decreases.
Simultaneously, DCSS expose minority shareholders to significant risks and potential undesirable outcomes. In addition to restricting the control that the subordinate voting shareholders have over board composition and company strategy, DCSS can also result in executive compensation for the holders of the superior voting class shares, leadership transition issues, and payment of significant premiums to collapse the DCSS. In 2021, the battle for control of
Shareholder Protection in DCSS
The concerns notwithstanding, there are ways to reduce risks for shareholders of subordinate voting shares, while allowing all shareholders to reap the benefits of DCSS. By enacting certain shareholder protections, such as coattail provisions and sunset clauses, companies can create DCSS that provide for greater alignment of interests between all common shareholders.
(1) Coattail Provisions
Canadian DCSS companies have almost universally adopted a coattail provisions.4 Coattail provisions ensure that holders of subordinate voting shares can convert their holdings to superior voting shares in the event of a takeover offer, thus allowing them to participate in the offer on the same terms. Coattail provisions have been a TSX listing requirement since 1987 and have removed most of the potential "private benefits of control" through a DCSS.
(2) Sunset Clauses
Sunset clauses impose a pre-determined end date for DCSS. These sunsets limit the relative freedom given to the shareholders of the superior voting right shares. Sunsets come in a variety of forms, including:
- Time-based sunsets: whereby the superior voting rights cease after a specified time period (e.g., Teck's Sunset).
- Dilution sunsets: whereby the multiple voting shares return to single votes when the controlling shareholder's voting power falls below a given threshold.
- Event-driven sunsets: where the DCSS collapse follows a certain event, usually the death or disability of founder/controlling shareholder.
Certain proxy advisory services have started to recommend against voting in favour of multi-class share structures and unequal voting rights amongst shareholders, unless the company provides for a reasonable sunset of its multi-class share structure. Glass Lewis and the
Conclusion
While Teck's Dual Class Amendment marks another step in the growing trend towards the disappearance of DCSS in
Footnotes
1. The David and
2. Finra, "Supervoters and Stocks: What Investors Should Know About Dual-Class Voting Structures." (
3. Rogers v.
4.
5. Glass Lewis, "2023 Policy Guidelines -
The foregoing provides only an overview and does not constitute legal advice. Readers are cautioned against making any decisions based on this material alone. Rather, specific legal advice should be obtained.
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