Abstract
The credibility of a jurisdiction in having an arbitration-friendly regime is primarily based upon its enforcement mechanism because the greater is the efficiency of the mechanism, the higher is the success rate of enforcement. The efficacy of enforcement mechanism is directly affected by the judicial consistency in enforcing the foreign arbitral awards as it must have clearly defined enforcement regime so that there is no room for non-uniform application or exercise of judicial discretion. The article attempts to provide a comparative analysis of the enforcement regime of two hubs of foreign investments: India and China and to determine the difference in their judicial attitude and legal mechanism in order to evaluate which provides a more pro-enforcement approach to foreign awards. The author has strictly restricted the scope of the study to enforcement of foreign awards and highlighting the trend in India and China. Further, the author has delimited the scope to analysis of legal structure and examination of judicial attitude in respect of "public policy" ground. The article also presents the data collected from secondary sources for substantiating the proactive role of nations in enforcement process and finally, after making a critical evaluation of the study, concludes with the result of the study.
Keywords:India, China, Foreign Awards, Enforcement regime, Judicial Attitude, and Public Policy.
Behind the Veil of India's Mechanism for Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award
In India, the execution of foreign awards is predicated on minimal court intrusion so as to promote India's pro-arbitration and subsequently, build a favorable environment for foreign investment.1 To this end, laws governing the execution of such awards is deliberately altered in order to restrict the spectrum of challenging grounds available to award debtor and restricts courts from adopting a broadly construed interpretation of those grounds. India has adopted and executed a pro-enforcement mechanism for foreign arbitral awards by embracing a proactive and flexible stance. In the landmark case of Govt. of India v. Vedanta Ltd.,2 the Supreme Court ruled unequivocally that courts should be reluctant in not enforcing arbitral awards and should endeavor to adopt a non-interference approach. Further, the Apex Court on various occasion has established the affinity for more pro-enforcement regime by explicitly stating the adoption of "minimum judicial interference" policy and delimiting the scope and extent of intervention only to the grounds available for its non-enforcement under Art. 48 of the A&C Act, 1996.3
A Close Look at India's 'Public Policy' Delimitation
The legislative efforts have also improved the India's stance regarding the execution of foreign awards. For a long time, the Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act, 1961 governed how foreign awards may be put into effect such as section 7 of the Act provided the procedural and jurisdictional grounds for the non-enforcement which were similar to that specified under the New York Convention (hereinafter referred as "the Convention"). Moreover, the current grounds under the A&C Act 19964 are nothing but a reflection of the section 7 of the Act.
However, the legislative efforts for a pro-enforcement regime are reflected by the enactment of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 where the legislature has tried to restrict the scope of non-enforcement by providing a more restrictive application of the public policy ground. The ground can only be invoked in certain circumstances intended to control the discretion of judiciary while interpreting 'public policy' because it was prone to broad interpretation owing to the phrase used in sec. 7 of the Foreign Award Act i.e., "the enforcement of the award will be contrary to public policy", imparting no definite meaning to the term 'public policy'.
However, due to the subjective interpretation of 'public policy'5 phrase in the initial period by courts, the legislature felt the need of importing a fixed meaning to this ground so that the decision of courts in matters of enforcement are not swayed by their personal opinion. As a consequence of this, the legislature came out with 2015 Amendment which restricted the exercise of discretion by Indian courts and conferred a new rigid application to this ground. The 2015 Amendment was brought to Article 48 (2) of the 1996 A&C Act which appended a clarification to the meaning of 'public policy' and explicitly provided the circumstances where it will lead to non-enforcement such as when the award is vitiated by "fraud or corruption", violates the "fundamental policy of Indian law" or is against the basic tenets of "morality and justice".6 Thus, the 2015 Amendment was a major step in providing clarification to the public policy ground so that it can be interpreted in a restricted sense7 by the Indian courts and also, in order to achieve a uniform application by courts.
No stamping of Foreign Award: An attribute of Pro-Enforcement Attitude
To further ease out the process of enforcement, the Apex Court of India held in M/s. Shri Ram Ltd. case,8 that the foreign awards are not necessarily required to be stamped. Thus, a foreign award will be valid for enforcement even if it is unstamped. A similar view was held in relation to registration of foreign award where the court held that it is not necessary to register the foreign award as it is liable to be enforced as decree of the court.9
Therefore, India has embraced a "pro-enforcement bias" towards foreign awards which is reflected in its judicial decisions as well as in its legislative efforts with the introduction of 2015 Amendment.
An In-depth Analysis of China's Enforcement Regime from the lens of legislative framework
From the time when there has been a spectacular rise in Chinese economy, a great length has been written about the Chinese legal system and some of which brings an unfavorable light to China. When the concern is about Chinese legal system, a great part of the criticism has been inflicted upon the Chinese law of Arbitration and notably, the execution of foreign arbitral award in alignment with the scheme of the Convention. In the preceding years, numerous studies have been undertaken by US scholars where they have discussed and evaluated the China's effort to enforce the awards as per the mandate and conditions of the Convention.10 However, as stated above, the major criticism of Chinese legal system has not been in their favour and casts a negative light, thus, a similar result was found in the studies that were conducted in United States revealing that the China's mechanism and approach towards execution of foreign arbitral awards has some major flaws.11
The effectiveness of China's arbitral practices in enforcing foreign awards in order to create a line of comparison between the Indian and Chinese legal trends in foreign arbitral awards and their effectiveness in enforcement is critically examined in the following part under different heads. However, it is not based on the presumption of the earlier study's conclusions; rather, it aims to analyze the statement of problem with respect to China's regime for execution of foreign arbitral award from a non-presumptive perspective and assess whether the situation in China is same as that concluded by US commentators12 or it has a different side to it.
China's Governing law for Enforcement of Foreign Awards
China's legal regime creates a demarcation among the arbitral awards and sets out different laws and procedures for their enforcement which superficially favours the execution of foreign award. There are three kinds of arbitral award: domestic13, foreign-related14 and foreign arbitral award15. Art. 269 of the Civil Procedure Law (hereinafter referred as "the CPL") provides for the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral award by people's court and directs the foreign party:
"...directly apply to the intermediate people's court in the place where the party subject to execution has its domicile or where its property is located. The people's court shall deal with the matter in accordance with the relevant provisions of the international treaties concluded or acceded to by the People's Republic of China or under the principle of reciprocity".16
Thus, Art. 269 only specifies the jurisdiction of the court to which a foreign party must approach for such enforcement whereas Art. 283 merely provides that the enforcement of foreign awards can be denied on the grounds that are listed under Article V of the New York Convention. On the other hand, if we see this in actual practice, the enforcement is majorly governed by:
- the Convention to which China acceded in 198717,
- the Supreme People's Court notice (the SPC notice)18 that provides for the implementation of the NY Convention and China's obligations towards it and;
- the domestic Arbitration Law of China.19
Art. 71 of the Arbitration law enumerates the grounds for non-enforcement which is same as provided in Article V of the Convention while Art. 283 of the CPL provides that the courts may deny execution on the grounds listed in Article V. But the core of the enforcement lies in Art. 277 of the CPL where the grounds are specifically provided (as in incorporation in domestic law: "dualist approach") with a slight modification in one ground where it has replaced the words 'public policy' as provided in the Convention with the words 'social and public interest'. Thus, there is no such phrase as public policy in China's domestic law.20
Furthermore, the grounds mentioned in Art. V of the NYC are categorized into two heads which are procedural matters and jurisdictional matters. Procedural matters as mentioned under Art. V (1) include the following:
- Validity of the arbitration agreement21;
- Proper notice of arbitration proceedings was given to the other party22;
- Scope of arbitration i.e., if the issues fell outside the term of reference of tribunal23;
- Composition of the tribunal and arbitral procedure24;
- Binding award.25
While the jurisdictional matters under Art. V (2) include the following:
- Arbitrability of the subject matter26;
- Social and public interest ground.27
In case of the grounds covered under procedural matters, the courts do not have the power to deny the execution unless the defect in procedure or the ground is taken by the contending party explicitly. On the other hand, the Court has the discretion to deny the execution in case it's a ground of jurisdictional matter even if the party has not raised this issue. Therefore, this bifurcation is reflective of the relaxed attitude towards enforcement of awards since it has a low threshold for non-enforcement in jurisdictional matters only i.e., only in jurisdictional cases, the courts can strictly deny the enforcement and are bound to enforce it even if there is procedural flaw, but it has not been pleaded by the other party. Moreover, it can be observed that Art. 71 of the Arbitration Law, Art. 283 of the CPL and Article 4 of the SPC specify that the courts "may refuse the enforcement" implying that the courts are not bound to strictly follow the grounds as specified and may allow the enforcement in some of the matters which does not go to the root of the subject matter or if allowed, it will not lead to miscarriage of justice.
Thus, it can be presumed that China's legislative framework is created on the line of pro-enforcement regime facilitating a broad enforcement policy towards such awards but before coming to any conclusions, it is necessary to evaluate the actual reality of enforcement which lies in the hands of judiciary.
Enforcement Strategies of India and China: A Comparative Study
Judicial Attitude Towards 'Public Policy' Ground
CHINA
Chinese law construes the term 'public policy' as "public and social interest" which has a wider scope of meaning attached to it and this "public and social interest" criteria is assessed by employing its domestic standard that is construed as the fundamental public and social interest i.e., the basic legal and moral principles of China. Public policy ground is interpreted broadly in China. However, the major concern is what does "social and public interest" imply? In order to comprehend the meaning imported by the term, it is important to look at the judicial interpretation of this term and their approach while denying the enforcement of awards with the help of case laws.
In TCL Air-Conditioner (Zhongsham) Ltd. v. Castel Electronics Pty Limited28, the SPC recorded that the following will amount to violation of public social interest:
- Breach of the basic principle
- Violation of public policy
- Infringement of national sovereignty
- Jeopardizing public security
- Other circumstances
Further, in Hemofarm D.D. et. al v. Jinan Yonging Pharmaceutical29, it was held that when a Chinese court has already decided upon the issues which were dealt by the foreign arbitral award, but the decision reached in award is contravening to what has been laid down by the Chinese court, then in such cases, the inconsistency of the award with the judgement passed in domestic court will be a breach of Chinese judicial sovereignty and thus, is in contravention to its public policy. Contrarily, if the judgement was delivered after the issue of award, it will not be repugnant to the judgement at the time of its enforcement and thus, it cannot be considered as violative of public policy ground.
The tendency of the courts to protect local party is also a concern where the courts are applying this ground in order to provide local protectionism and this is evidencable in the case of Dongfeng Garments Factory of Kai Feng City and Taichun International Trade (HK) Co. Ltd. v. Henan Garments Import & Export (Group) Co. (1992) case30. In this matter, the IPC opined that enforcing a foreign award which is in favour of the foreign party is contrary to the interest of the local Chinese party and thus, will be treated as a contravention of public and social interest. The Court recorded that the local party was liable to pay damages to the foreign party, still it denied the enforcement of the foreign award because according to it, directing the local party to pay the monetary damages will lead to a consequential impact on the local economy and thus, is a ground of public and social interest.31
The interpretation of the term "public social interest" is thus, very broad and is also inclusive of the public policy ground which in itself would have had a narrow meaning if it was incorporated verbatim from the NY Convention. It entails that the Chinese courts have been conferred with greater degree of discretion while exercising the jurisdiction for enforcement and this unbridled discretion in having no fixed construction and meaning of the phrase would be detriment of the interest of foreign party. However, in India, the situation is quiet opposite as India's judicial attitude towards the ground of public policy follows a strict narrow construction when it comes to execution of foreign awards32 as observed in Shri Lal Mahal Ltd. v. Progettograno Spa.33 The interpretation of "public policy" in case of domestic arbitral award34 is comparative wider than that rendered under the enforcement of foreign awards.35
Further, the courts in China have the tendency to reject the enforcement in order to protect their domestic industries (especially state-owned enterprises i.e., local protectionism) and creates a certain kind of bias against a foreign party.36 Thus, in light of the cases discussed, it can be deduced that public policy ground does not have uniform application in Chinese courts and is applied, according to their local interests and personal opinion. It is quiet contrary that though China has been serving as one of the destinations for huge foreign investments, it has not reformed its judicial attitude in consonance with the foreign party's interest so that it can increase their confidence to invest in their local industries by providing an impartial mechanism for enforcing the foreign arbitral award.
However, the data collected on rejection of enforcement presents a different view as there are very few cases where the courts have denied the enforcement by relying upon this ground.37 This ground is rarely invoked in China which in turn, implies that China has not expanded its approach for non-enforcement. In ED & F Man (HK) Co. Ltd. v. China National Sugar Wines Group Co.38 and Mitsui Corp. (Japan) v. Hainan Textile Industry General Corp.39, the court clearly declared that infringement of domestic law i.e., Chinese law will not be necessarily treated as a violation of public social interest. This judgment is quiet contrary to what was laid down in Hemofarm case40 because in that, the court had held that it would amount to breach of public policy if the award passed is in contravention of the reasoning laid down by Chinese court; thus, giving supremacy to judicial sovereignty while if it is inconsistent with the domestic laws, it will not be treated as a ground. Thus, there is no doubt that the analysis of the courts is flawed and is generally guided by their whims and fancies as there is no strict rule that delimits the scope of use of this ground. However, in GRD Minproc Ltd. v. Shanghai Feilun Industrial Co.41, it was held that the question whether an award was fair and just on its merits cannot be assessed while taking the ground of public and social interest while in Tianrui Hotel Investment Co. Ltd. v. Hangzhou Yiju Hotel Management Co.42, it was opined that breach of rules on franchise industry entry restriction doesn't imply the infringement of social and public interest.
INDIA
India's judicial system has been making developments over the last decade to bring into line with the international practices for enforcing foreign awards. From the Apex Court's judgment in Renusagar case,43it is evidencable that the judiciary's prime concern is always to adopt pro-enforcement bias and prefer a narrow construction if possible. In this case, the court opined that the phrase "fundamental policy of Indian law" will mean those legal principles which are so basic and essential to Indian legal system that their breach is not acceptable at any costs because these principles form the bedrock of our legal structure. Thus, it was held that breach of any legislative provision cannot be considered as a breach of "fundamental policy" of Indian law. The decision of Indian Judiciary was based on the rationale that conferring a wider ambit to this ground will lead to its misuse to delay and forego the execution. Further, in Ssanyong Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI,44 the Supreme Court held that the ground of justice and morality can only be invoked only in rare circumstances where such violation has led to miscarriage of justice and has appalled the shocked the conscience of the court.
However, the courts have blurred the demarcation of public policy ground by allowing the review of the award on merits while examining enforcement application, setting aside the award on ground of public policy45 and importing a wider meaning to 'public policy' as that rendered in domestic award. The approach was later corrected by the court in Bharat Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc.46and Shri Lal Mahal Ltd. case47 where it was observed that review on merits is not a ground of challenge for enforcement. Thus, India has settled its position with respect to public policy ground that the courts are not expected to interfere with the subject matter of the award because the merits have been already examined, discussed and decided by another court, the role of Indian courts is only to enforce the awards. Further, the ground of public policy is not subject to various interpretations as it is settled it means the basic principles of our legal system that cannot be compromised at any cost. Thus, India has aligned its interpretation with the intent and objective of the NY Convention.
China's Automatic System of Appeal: A Positive Aspect
Chinese Arbitration law provides a different mechanism that is generally not followed in India so as to ensure the monitoring of lower courts i.e., IPC while they exercise this jurisdiction. China's separate mechanism called "Supervisory Reporting System" is reflective of the China's solicitude for enforcement of such awards. Art. 2 of the SPC provides that in matters related to "foreign-related arbitration" and "foreign arbitration", where the Intermediate People's Court (IPC) is of the decision to refuse the enforcement, then it cannot be implemented unless the decision for not to enforce is reviewed by the Higher People's Court and if the latter is also of the same opinion, the decision will be further reviewed by the SPC. Further, this mechanism has centralized the judicial review in the highest judicial body as the decision of non-enforcement will always be rendered by the highest judicial body i.e., the SPC, unlike in India as we have no such double scrutiny mechanism for enforcing such awards. In a study, it was found that out of the 48 cases which case for review of the SPC under Reporting System, the court allowed the refusal in 21 cases.48 Thus, this procedural system ensures a double scrutiny of the decision to refuse to enforce and thus, is significant of the pro-active role of Chinese courts in matters of foreign award enforcement and how they act with caution before passing a decision of non-enforcement by providing a safety valve in order to prevent the miscarriage of justice to the parties.
Limitation Period: India v. China
Art. III of the Convention is silent upon the issue of limitation period. Courts have determined that limitation periods for seeking the recognition and execution of foreign awards have been ruled to be procedural rules subject to the competent state's domestic law. Therefore, this will usually be determined according to the law of the place of enforcement. Thus, the limitation period for enforcing is significant to be considered because it will clearly have a significant impact on the enforcement at the outset.
India and China have applied limitation periods found in their domestic procedural rule pursuant to Art. III of the Convention. In India, there was ambiguity in determining the limitation period for the enforcement because the earlier rule was that it would be in accordance with Art. 136 of the Limitation Act read with sec. 49 of the A&C Act, 1996, which stipulated that a foreign award would be enforced as a court decree, and thus, the limitation period generally followed by the Indian Judiciary was 12 years. In the case of Vedanta Ltd.49, the Indian courts developed a pro-enforcement bias approach, holding that the applicability of Art. 136 is immaterial to the matter of enforcement of foreign awards and that the term of limitation is governed by Art. 137 of the Limitation Act. Therefore, the party will have 3 years to enforce the award. This decision was a significant turning point in Indian arbitration law since it ensured a flawless enforcement mechanism by closing loopholes in the domestic legal system.
However, in China the limitation period for enforcement of foreign award is provided under Art. 239 of the CPL as clarified in the SPC i.e., the limitation period is of two years.50 Further, it provides that it shall commence from the last day of the period mentioned in the legal document and if it is to be to be enforced in stages, then from the last day of last enforcement stage period.51 The approach of Chinese courts is that the limitation period will commence from the day when the assets of the award debtor for enforcement in China, are discovered by the award creditor i.e. when the jurisdiction of the court for enforcement is approved.52 Furthermore, the Chinese law provides for suspension of limitation period under Art. 239 of the CPL when the Applicant withdraws the enforcement application.53
Concluding Remarks
Following a pro-enforcement approach for countries like India and China is quiet significant owing to the fact that they are one of the biggest hubs for foreign investments; thus, it becomes more crucial for such nations to adopt a pro-foreign investment approach by minimizing the interference with the enforcement mechanism. In light of the discussion above, it is deduced that India has adopted the enforcement mechanism with a more positive attitude keeping in mind the interest of foreign investors and also in order to provide a more effective and easy procedure of mechanism with less judicial intervention; thus, removing the legislative hurdles for foreign investment. It shows that India respects the finality of foreign awards by minimizing the impediments in its enforcement. Further, over the last decade of years, India has reshaped and aligned the judicial attitude with landmark judgments so that the ground of "public policy" is not misused. On the other hand, China also proves to be pro-active in enforcement mechanism, but it does have some shortcomings such as the non-uniform application of "public social interest" since greater degree of discretion conferred upon the Chinese judiciary while exercising jurisdiction on enforcement application though it has decided for non-enforcement in very few cases. However, China also has a positive side to enforcement mechanism like the Supervisory reporting mechanism which ensures that the decision of non-enforcement is an outcome of the deliberation of highest judicial body. Thus, the study concludes that China is not as pro-active as India but still its enforcement rate of foreign award cannot be ignored keeping in mind its judicial developments and the legal framework.
Footnotes
1. NTT Docomo Inc. v. Tata Sons Ltd. 2017 SCC OnLine Del 8078; Khaitan & Co., 'Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and Scope of Judicial Intervention: A Minimalist Approach' (Lexology, 2 July 2020) (https://www.lexology.com/commentary/arbitration-adr/india/khaitan-co/enforcement-of-foreign-arbitral-awards-and-scope-of-judicial-intervention-a-minimalist-approach) accessed on 12 February 2023.
2. (2020) 10 SCC 1.
3. Vijay Karia v. Prysmian Cavi E Sistemi SRL (2020) 11 SCC 1.
4. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, Art. 48.
5. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, Art. 48 (2).
6. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996., Art. 48 (2) Explanation I.
7. Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co. (1994) Supp (1) SCC 644.
8. Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co. (1994) Supp (1) SCC 644.
9. Naval Gent Maritime Ltd. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain (I) Ltd. (2009) 174 DLT 391.
10. Xiaowen Qiu, 'Enforcing Arbitral Awards Involving Foreign Parties: A comparison of the United States and China' (2000) 11 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 607; Fiona D'souza, 'The Recognition and Enforcement of Commercial Arbitral Awards in the People's Republic of China' (2007) 30 Fordham Int'l L.J. 1318.
11. Randall Peerenboom, 'Seek Truth from acts: An Empirical Study of the Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in the PRC' (2001) 49 Am. J. Comp. L. 249, 253-255; Manjiao Chi, 'Time to make a Change? A comparative Study of Chinese Arbitration Law and the 2006 UNICTRAL Model Law and the Forecast of Chinese Arbitration Law Reform' (2009) 5 Asian Int'l Arb. J. 142; Christopher Hen, 'International Arbitration and Enforcement in China: Historical Perspectives and Current Trends' (2005) 14 Currents: Int'l Trade L.J. 69, 74-76.
12. Id.
13. The Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China, Art. 217.
14. The Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China, Art. 65.
15. The Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China, Art. 269.
16. The Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China, Art. 269.
17. Mark S. Hamilton, 'Sailing in an Asia of Obscurity: The Following Important of China's Maritime Arbitration Commission' (2002) 3 Asia Pac. LJ 10.
18. The Supreme People's Court Notice (hereinafter "the SPC Notice"), Article 4.
19. The Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China, Art. 71.
20. The Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China, Art. 260 (2).
21. The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958), Art. V (1) (a).
22. The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958), Art. V (1) (b).
23. The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958), Art. V (1) (c).
24. The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958), Art. V (1) (d).
25. The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958), Art. V (1) (e); The Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China, Art. 9.
26. The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958), Art. V (2) (a).
27. The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958), Art. V (2) (b); The Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China, Art. 274
28. [2014] FCAFC 83.
29. [2008] Min Si Ta Zi No. 11.
30. Cheng Dejung et. al, 'International Arbitration in the PRC, in Randall Peerenboom, The Evolution Regulation Framework for Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in the PRC' (2000) 1 Asia Pac. Law Policy Journal 3.
31. Cheng Dejung et. al, 'International Arbitration in the PRC, in Randall Peerenboom, The Evolution Regulation Framework for Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in the PRC' (2000) 1 Asia Pac. Law Policy Journal 3.
32. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, Art. 48.
33. (2014) 2 SCC 433.
34. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, Art. 34.
35. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, Art. 48.
36. Reger P. Alford et. al., 'Perceptions and Reality: The Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in China' (2016) 33 UCLA Pac. Basin L. J. 1, 2 (https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2372&context=faculty_scholarship); Ellen Reinstein, 'Finding a Happy Ending for Foreign Investors: The Enforcement of Arbitration Awards in the People's Republic of China' (2005) 16 Ind. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 37, 64.
37. Reger P. Alford et. al., 'Perceptions and Reality: The Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in China' (2016) 33 UCLA Pac. Basin L. J. 1, 22, (https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2372&context=faculty_scholarship).
38. [2003] Min Si Ta Zi No. 3.
39. [2001] Min Si Ta Zi No. 12.
40. [2008] Min Si Ta Zi No. 11.
41. [2008] Min Si Ta Zi No. 48.
42. [2010] Zhe Shang Wai Ta Zi No. 3.
43. [2010] Zhe Shang Wai Ta Zi No. 3.
44. 2019 SCC OnLine SC 677.
45. Venture Global Engineering v. Satyam Computer Services Pvt. Ltd. 2017 SCC OnLine SC 1272.
46. (2012) 9 SCC 552.
47. (2014) 2 SCC 433.
48. Reger P. Alford et. al., 'Perceptions and Reality: The Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in China' (2016) 33 UCLA Pac. Basin L. J. 1,10 (https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2372&context=faculty_scholarship);.
49. (2020) 10 SCC 1.
50. Interpretations of the Supreme People's Court on the Application of the Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China, Art. 547.
51. The Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China, Art. 239.
52. Shanghai Jwell Machinery Co. Ltd. v. Retech Aktiengesellschaft SPC Guiding Case No. 37.
53. O'Key Logistics LLC v. Guangdong SouthFortune Import & Export Co. Ltd. [2013] Sui Zhongfa Minsi Chuzi No. 12.
Sneha is a student of Maharashtra National Law University, Aurangabad and Winner of the Honourable Mention Prize of the 9th Ed. of Arb Excel Essay Writing Competition.
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