The vision? To sell stakes, concessions, and assets to attract private capital, slim down the State, and recover dollars in a country where external constraints remain the true frontier of any economic policy.
According to the Minister of Economy, the Treasury hopes to raise approximately USD 2 billion from privatizations and concessions by the end of 2026. Meanwhile, on May 4, the government published a "Necessity and Urgency" decree allocating 10% of proceeds from the sale of State assets to the Ministry of Defense and the armed forces. In Milei's view, the State must disappear from almost everywhere. But not from defense. There, on the contrary, it must remain strong, funding equipment, modernizing military capabilities, integrating new technologies—notably artificial intelligence—and strengthening cybersecurity.
This acceleration comes in an economy that has clearly stopped burning: inflation slowed to 3.4% in the single month of March 2026 and 32.6% year-on-year, GDP rebounded by 4.4% in 2025, while unemployment remained contained at 7.5% in the fourth quarter of 2025.
Trading Economics
Under Milei, the fiscal "chainsaw" was only the first step. The second is the redefinition of the State's very perimeter: what it continues to own, what it concedes, what it abandons to the private sector, and what it hopes to finance with this transformation. Behind the libertarian rhetoric lies a well-identified mechanism: paying down debt, reassuring the International Monetary Fund, and demonstrating to markets that Argentina can cease to be a country where fiscal adjustment leads to nothing but recession.
From a Crisis Economy to an Economy Under Surveillance
When Milei took office in December 2023, the Argentine economy was emerging from a period of chronic monetary and fiscal disorder. The government has since reversed the trend: in 2024, the country recorded its first financial budget surplus in 14 years, amounting to 0.3% of GDP, with a primary surplus of 1.8% of GDP.
A few months later, in April 2025, Buenos Aires sealed a new USD 20 billion program with the IMF and began dismantling most of the exchange controls that had paralyzed investment and fueled monetary distortions for nearly six years.
The macroeconomic recovery is real, but it is no miracle. Argentina's statistics agency, INDEC, shows an economy that first absorbed the shock of austerity before rebounding: GDP contracted by 1.3% in 2024, then grew by 4.4% last year. In 2025, growth was primarily driven by private consumption, investment, and exports, with strong increases in finance and mining. However, some sectors remain fragile: manufacturing grew by only 0.8%, and in the fourth quarter, it was still down 5% year-on-year. Conversely, the poverty rate fell from 52.9% of the population in the first half of 2024 to 28.2% in the second half of 2025, a decline hailed by the IMF and cited by authorities as proof that disinflation is once again protecting incomes.
On the other hand, economic life remains strained: as early as 2025, a drop of more than 15% in real terms was observed in public sector wages alongside a rise in informal labor; in 2026, the auto parts sector reported losing about 5,000 jobs in 2025, nearly 10% of its workforce; and household credit defaults rose to 10.6% in January 2026, compared to 2.8% when Milei took office.
Privatization as Doctrine and a Need for Dollars
Since his campaign, Milei has repeated that the State must not replace the entrepreneur. His framework assumes a return to the references of 1990s Argentina, when Carlos Menem made the free market and privatizations the major axis of his economic policy. At the time, the country sold nearly 65 state-owned enterprises to the private sector. Telecommunications, energy, transport, services: a massive wave of privatizations transformed the Argentine economy. Milei is reviving this lineage, but in a very different context. In the 1990s, Argentina sought to anchor itself to liberal globalization. In 2026, it seeks above all to exit a cycle of crisis and distrust.
Initially, the government wanted to privatize 41 state-owned companies. However, Congress slowed the process. After lengthy debates, only 8 companies were included in the "Ley Bases," the major reform adopted six months after Milei came to power.
For now, only one company has been officially privatized: IMPSA, specialized in metal equipment, sold in 2025 to a US consortium. A symbolic first sale, politically significant but financially insufficient.
Since then, the executive has accelerated.
Several files are now on the table: AySA, the national water and sanitation company; Transener, which manages high-voltage electricity transmission; Intercargo, an airport services player; not to mention the debates surrounding Aerolineas Argentinas, the national airline and one of the most sensitive symbols of the Argentine State.
AySA is particularly strategic. The company serves approximately 14 million people in Buenos Aires and its surrounding region. Its privatization could bring in around 500 million dollars. But it involves an essential service: water. And privatizing water never carries the same political weight as selling an industrial stake.
Transener, for its part, manages about 12,600 kilometers of high-voltage lines. Here again, the stakes go beyond a simple share sale. Electricity transmission is the backbone of the economy. Without a reliable grid, there is no competitive industry, no productive modernization, and no energy integration. Divesting a stake in such a central player means bringing private capital into one of the country's vital nerves.
In parallel, Argentina had to honor a USD 4.3 billion bond payment, relying notably on a 3 billion repo signed by the central bank with six international banks. In April, the World Bank said it was working on a guarantee of up to USD 2 billion to help the country refinance its debt. Privatizations thus fit into a broader strategy: gaining dollars without immediately reopening the tap of expensive and politically dangerous external debt.
The Milei Bet
The simplest answer would be to say: because Milei believes in it. That would be true, but insufficient. The real driver is deeper: Argentina wants to regain room for maneuver without falling back into its old dependence on the international debt market. Investors have begun to welcome the macroeconomic stabilization: Fitch raised the country's sovereign rating to "B-" in early May 2026. But the same agency reminded in the same breath that vulnerabilities remain high: still-elevated inflation, low international reserves, and a long history of macro-financial instability.
Consequently, selling a public asset becomes a multi-layered instrument. It supports the Treasury without increasing external debt, shows the IMF that reform commitments are progressing, occasionally feeds the central bank with foreign currency, or, more precisely, relieves pressure on overall dollar financing. It also sends a political signal: Milei's Argentina wants to demonstrate that it will not return to the old model—that of an omnipresent State, employer of last resort, manager of airlines, water, airport ramps, and power lines, often at the cost of recurring subsidies or recapitalizations.
Privatizations also seek to send a message to international investors: Argentina is back.
For years, the country was perceived as unstable, unpredictable, inflationary, protectionist, and dependent on exchange controls and debt renegotiations. Milei wants to reverse this narrative. He wants to show that Argentina is ready to welcome capital, reduce State intervention, respect contracts, and reward investment.
This is essential for the country's strategic sectors: energy, lithium, shale gas, mining, agriculture, infrastructure, logistics, and technology. Argentina possesses enormous assets. But its repeated crises have often prevented their full valuation.
Privatizations thus become a showcase. If they succeed, they can help restore confidence. If they fail, they may reinforce the idea that Argentina remains incapable of transforming its promises into stable institutions.
